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AFTERWORD: TOWARD STABLE PRINCIPLES AND
USEFUL HEGEMONIES
GREGORY C. PINGREE*
These papers reflect a larger, ongoing conversation about the re-
lationship between law and culture, a relationship that, for its com-
plex open-endedness, eludes any fixed definition. In attempting to
sketch the shape of that relationship, Robert Post examines with
characteristic insight some of the jurisprudential lineage of the law-
culture conversation, reminding us that the notion of legal neutrality
is illusory, and that culture itself is neither stable nor coherent.1 The
papers that ensue are emblematic of many conversations -academic,
political, and other- taking place along the broad spectrum of critical
methodologies and historical topics that constitute the "law and
culture" discourse.2 Yet if these symposium papers' diverse perspec-
tives invoke any point of unity, it is, to paraphrase Sartre, the search
for a method-for a coherent framework in which to evaluate the
conflicts and judgments of human society. This normative enterprise
is a fundamental part of legal history and theory, of course, but the
critical protocols and disciplinary contours of the enterprise have
evolved along with the ambient culture. In light of both the constant
"search for a method" and the evolving relationship between law and
culture, the modest point I want to make in reflecting on the discus-
sions of this symposium is that they further demonstrate the unique
framework that the law provides for understanding cultural conflict.
What is unique about the legal take on cultural conflict? Essen-
tially, that the law must concern itself to an unparalleled degree with
both its internal coherence and its external implications. That is, the
law focuses on standards of judgment and conduct not only to achieve
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, and co-
organizer of the symposium.
1. Robert Post, Law and Cultural Conflict, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 485, 492 (2003).
Several symposium authors assert the impossibility of legal neutrality. See, e.g., Nancy E.
Dowd, Law, Culture, and Family: The Transformative Power of Culture and the Limits of Law,
78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 785 (2003).
2. For an excellent brief discussion of the growing field of law and culture studies, see
Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, The Cultural Lives of Law, in LAW IN THE DOMAINS OF
CULTURE 1 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1998).
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satisfactory philosophical and moral consistency, but to establish also
workable, pragmatic social frameworks. This necessary balance
yields a particularly grounded kind of thinking about cultural conflict,
one which must (a) at least take seriously the useful fiction that
cultural conflict can be mediated from a place of deliberate, princi-
pled neutrality, and (b) remain attentive to the invariably social,
experiential ramifications of its judgments. These symposium pro-
ceedings address both points.
I
As to the problem of neutrality, the law's concern is not whether
anyone believes neutrality is fully possible (if anyone ever did),3 but
rather that the law must choose from among many defensible argu-
ments that enlist the ideal of neutrality in the service of other inter-
pretive and ideological ends-say, Justice Scalia's rage for
distinguishing judicial involvement from judicial judgment,4 or Justice
Stevens' need for "a way to express an ambitious moral agenda in
terms that convey the impersonal authority of fundamental law."5 As
3. To view skeptically the dogma of pure legal neutrality is crucially different from
recognizing, relying on, even embracing the ideal of neutrality (along with other jurisprudential
ideals such as objectivity, truth finding, etc.) as a necessary fiction for purposes of achieving a
social order that is as just, fair, and democratic as possible. Vital to consequential legal analysis,
it seems to me, is the quality of one's self-consciousness about this difference-a point
exemplified variously in this symposium. And because the ideal of legal neutrality is, after all,
part of our basic sense of the common law, it should be neither surprising (nor necessarily
distressing) that such idealism persists in animating both adjudication and legal scholarship.
What matters is to maintain critical vigilance about the powerful mediating influence of that
idealism. Peter Goodrich remarks, for example, that this conceptual idealism tends to divert us
from a sensitivity to legal language as an index of culture:
Despite the linguistically dubious nature of the assumptions regularly made by formal-
istic (deductive) theories of adjudication, lawyers and legal theorists have successfully
maintained a superb oblivion to the historical and social features of legal language, and
rather than studying the actual development of legal linguistic practice, . . . have as-
serted deductive models of law peculiar to the internal development of legal regulation
and legal discipline. What has been consistently excluded from the ambit of legal
studies has been the possibility of analysing law as a specific stratification or "register"
of an actually existent language system, together with the correlative denial of the
heuristic value of analysing legal texts themselves as historical products organised
according to rhetorical criteria.
PETER GOODRICH, LEGAL DISCOURSE: STUDIES IN LINGUISTICS, RHETORIC AND LEGAL
ANALYSIS 1 (1987). Similarly, in his general symposium introduction, Robert Post draws upon
"the analogy of language" to illustrate the relativity of cultural stability: "Just as language is
constantly changing despite the fact that a functioning language requires relatively stable and
shared meanings, so cultural understandings are always shifting despite the fact that a function-
ing culture requires relatively stable and shared perspectives." Post, supra note 1, at 491.
4. Post, supra note 1, at 498.
5. Robert F. Nagel, Six Opinions by Mr. Justice Stevens: A New Methodology for
Constitutional Cases?, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 509, 511 (2003).
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several commentators observed during the symposium discussion, this
rhetorical struggle for the neutral high ground may be framed as one
of competing hegemonies, or better still as a continuous dialectic of
hegemonies and counter-hegemonies. But whatever one's angle, it
seems clear that to achieve meaningful traction in the legal conversa-
tion about cultural conflict requires the relatively stable footing
provided by interpretive schemes that assert some kind of principled
neutrality.6
This insight does not necessarily (if at all) lead to legal solutions
for cultural problems, insofar as resolving cultural conflict is an aim of
the law. Still, the process of clarifying both the ideological stakes and
the interpretive strategies involved in legal analysis of, for example,
polygamy or homosexuality reframes our collective preoccupation
with the regime of neutrality and enables us to explore more thought-
fully what all agree is a convoluted, symbiotic relationship between
law and culture. The philosopher Honi Fern Haber has characterized
this perspective shift as a kind of enlightened compromise, with
important implications for understanding culture:
There is no view from nowhere. We can never leave all our preju-
dices behind and operate from a wholly disinterested standpoint,
but our prejudices become dangerous only when they are dogmatic,
kept hidden from view and not open to discussion.... We cannot
think or speak, much less act, in any purposeful manner without
having structured our world and our interests in some heuristically
useful way. Without some notion of structure (unity) and some al-
lowance for a legitimate recognition of similarities between our-
selves and others, there can be no subject, community, language,
culture.7
I agree with Haber that recognizing the impossibility of neutral
standards, rather than undermining our attempts at useful dialogue,
actually frees us to consider more realistic avenues for evaluating
cultural conflict. This position of "stable relativity," resonant of
innumerable postmodern voices, is thus more than a resigned posture
toward the proverbial question whether neutral legal standards are
possible for the proper interpretation of culture and hence desirable
for the just regulation of cultural conflict. While these symposium
6. See, e.g., Mark D. Rosen, Establishment, Expressivism, and Federalism, 78 CHI.-KENT
L. REv. 669, 707 (2003) (arguing that "the Rawlsian-based approach to [Establishment Clause]
sizing developed here is more neutral than the approach found in the contemporary Establish-
ment Clause doctrine").
7. HONI FERN HABER, BEYOND POSTMODERN POLITICS: LYOTARD, RORTY,
FOUCAULT 1, 5 (1994) (emphasis added).
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discussions answer that question with a qualified "no" on both counts,
these papers more importantly emphasize that it is the practical
substance of that qualification that matters.
II
Indeed, most of the authors included here gesture toward a more
nuanced paradigm for understanding the relationship between law
and culture by centering their discussions on the concrete texture of
social and cultural conflict. For example, Sarah Barringer Gordon's
rhetorical analysis of nineteenth-century American public debates
over Mormon polygamy draws attention to the cultural complexity of
that controversial practice, suggesting the difficulty of any wholly
satisfactory legal response. 8  Mark Rosen develops some of the
constitutional questions of cultural integration and homogeneity
implicit in Gordon's analysis of Mormon polygamy and explores the
scope of those concerns in Establishment Clause debates about
diverse American religious practices.9 And Nancy Bentley, examining
American interracial marriage law, argues that the "cultural force of
intimacy.., lies in the shared sense that it originates somewhere
outside of either culture or law, in the immediacy of individual
feeling." 10
Although these papers demonstrate distinct kinds of cultural
analysis, each conveys its own sense of another indispensable dimen-
sion of law's relationship to culture-what Martha Nussbaum calls
"empathetic imagining," "an essential ingredient [along with a focus
on stable principles] of an ethical stance that asks us to concern
ourselves with the good of other people whose lives are distant from
our own."" Nancy Dowd devotes part of her analysis to this narrative
aspect of the law; reflecting on the legal impact of 9/11 on prevailing
structures of family law, she reasons that "[slympathy perhaps opened
the door to understanding the lived realities of families as consciously
plural. With that understanding may come another incremental shift
towards accepting, even valuing, actual relational ties. 1 2 In this and
8. Sarah Barringer Gordon, A War of Words: Revelation and Storytelling in the Campaign
Against Mormon Polygamy, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 739 (2003).
9. Rosen, supra note 6.
10. Nancy Bentley, Legal Feeling: The Place of Intimacy in Interracial Marriage Law, 78
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 773, 774 (2003).
11. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC
LIFE xvi (1995).
12. Dowd, supra note 1, at 805.
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other ways, these papers emphasize that the law must stand rooted in
concrete social experience even as it reaches for coherent principles
by which to regulate that experience; this is essentially what generates
the law's unique relationship to cultural conflict. In this sense,
cultural conflict is the law's raison d'.tre, for the law presupposes
human community and the intrinsic conflicts of human interaction.1 3
Although this symposium set as its subject the law's relationship
to cultural conflict, then, the discussions here implicate also the flip
side of that coin-what is, as Haber suggests, the possibility of unity,
of a shared sense of cultural understanding."4 But whether the
specific focus is cultural conflict or cultural unity, the point is that the
law is inexorably linked to culture; accordingly, we who theorize the
relationship between law and culture must consider the role that the
law plays in constituting culture itself." In so doing, we, as mem-
bers-elements-of that culture, function as though we were fish
theorizing water; in Sarat's formulation, "we come, in uncertain and
contingent ways, to see ourselves as law sees us; we participate in the
construction of law's 'meanings' and its representations of us even as
we internalize them, so much so that our own purposes and under-
standings can no longer be extricated from those meanings."' 6
III
The relationship between the localities of cultural practice and
the fashioning of coherent legal principles, and the role of the self-
conscious, liberal subject in theorizing that relationship, are familiar
concerns in contemporary critiques of law and philosophy. To
consider one, Stanley Fish, a critical voice in attendance at the
symposium, has recently declared that there exists no necessary
connection between metaphysical thinking and practical conduct. 7
After arguing that both Jirgen Habermas and Richard Rorty fall
prey, in their respective forms of pragmatism, to the naive belief that
13. Steven Shiffrin echoes this syllogism at the close of his discussion of the Establishment
Clause. Invoking Justice Holmes, Shiffrin concludes that "there are times when experience is
worth more than logic." Steven H. Shiffrin, Liberalism and the Establishment Clause, 78 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 717, 728 (2003).
14. HABER, supra note 7.
15. See Post, supra note 1, at 489.
16. Sarat & Kearns, supra note 2, at 7-8.
17. Stanley Fish, Truth but No Consequences: Why Philosophy Doesn't Matter, 29
CRITICAL INQUIRY 389 (2003).
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social good invariably issues from well-conceived philosophical
visions, Fish seeks to demystify with signature flourish:
Decency, like all other virtues invoked in discussions like these-
tolerance, straightforwardness, sincerity, accuracy, reliability, hon-
esty, generosity, objectivity, truth telling-is a quality independent
of the metaphysical views you happen to hold, if you hold any. In-
deed, everything, except for your profile in the narrow world of
high theory, is independent of the metaphysical views you happen
to hold. 18
This agnostic view of practical-to-metaphysical correspondence seems
a corollary to Steven Shiffrin's observation here that "there is no
principle in the sky which can be invoked in the style of political
geometry to resolve difficult questions about church and state."'19 Fish
claims that even those pragmatic theories that avoid the hegemony of
neutral principles or moral correctness nonetheless subscribe to the
false belief "that normative philosophy is not [itself] a local, prag-
matic practice like any other, but is a special practice in which the
local and pragmatic have been left behind."20  In Fish's view, this
broad fallacy, which obviously affects even the most sophisticated
thinkers, leads one right back to the original sin of the myth of
neutrality: one becomes, "in short, a theologian, maintaining himself
the disciplinary task of relating a historical, mundane occurrence to
its contingent and multiple causes."',
Taken as a whole, these symposium papers raise related ques-
tions, in the context of cultural conflict, about the possibility of
connecting theory to practice. Whether these discussions manage to
avoid the epistemological blindness that Fish decries remains to be
argued. But by emphasizing historical concreteness and practical
argument, as well as offering careful, reasoned perspective on the
present climate of secular and religious fundamentalism, these
presentations make a realistic contribution to the public conversation
about what is at stake when the law regulates cultural conflict.
18. Id. at 417.
19. Shiffrin, supra note 13, at 728.
20. Fish, supra note 17, at 403. Steven Heyman nicely characterizes this seductive will-to-
hermeneutic-transcendence in his discussion of the First Amendment: "Amid all this contro-
versy, there is a strong temptation to appeal to an idealized version of the First Amendment-
one with a clear meaning that stands above cultural conflict." Steven J. Heyman, Ideological
Conflict and the First Amendment, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 531, 533 (2003).




Notwithstanding that (in Habermas' famous phrase) "[o]ur first
sentence expresses unequivocally the intention of universal and
unconstrained consensus," 22 the discussions presented here move
toward engaging Fish's most compelling interrogatory: "How, then,
do you get to a place where the partisan and parochial visions that
have so immediate an appeal for embedded subjects can be countered
by a vision that belongs to no one but includes everyone?" 23 That
"place" of satisfactory equipoise between practice and theory is itself
an unreachable ideal, but the image of diverse minds aspiring to reach
such an elusive destination may be as apt a metaphor as any for the
setting that the law provides for analyzing cultural conflict. To work
toward that ideal is to practice what Nussbaum describes as "a
humanistic and multivalued conception of public rationality that is
powerfully exemplified in the common law tradition. ' 24 This affirma-
tive vision of the law may crowd Fish's "parsimonious and minimal-
ist" 25 argument, or it may hold out something of an antidote-a
rendering of the same glass as half-full.
Post's concluding remarks would appear to identify scant
common ground: "The only abstract truth seems to be that we cannot
escape the risks and responsibilities of practical judgment. '26 Yet
rather than be "disappointed by the relentlessly contextual nature of
these conclusions,"27 we might see substance and possibility in this
modest appraisal. Insofar as we are mindful of the core limitations of
thinking legally, we may benefit considerably from the idiosyncratic
perspectives of the law: philosophically inconsistent and ideologically
interested, to be sure, but anchored in and accountable to actual
experience. There is no view from nowhere, but here, in the law, are
an empathic "public rationality," a fundamental commitment to "the
risks and responsibilities of practical judgment," and a rich discourse
through which to explore our always contested place within the
matrix of culture.
22. JURGEN HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS 314 (Jeremy J. Shapiro
trans., 1971).
23. Fish, supra note 17, at 398.
24. Nussbaum, supra note 11, at xv.
25. Fish, supra note 17, at 417.
26. Post, supra note 1, at 508.
27. Id.
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